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Board of Educ. of Kiryas 
Joel Village v. Grumet: 
STATUTE 
CREATING SCHOOL 
DISTRICT 
DESIGNED TO 
BENEFIT A 
RELIGIOUS GROUP 
VIOLATES THE 
ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In a six to three deci-
sion, the United States Supreme 
Court in Board of Educ. of 
Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 
114 S.Ct. 2481 (1994), held 
that a New York statute creat-
ing a school district for the ben-
efit ofa religious enclaveviolat-
ed the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. Although 
the Court's decision upheld the 
ideal of governmental neutrality 
toward religion, it failed to de-
vise a workable standard for 
analyzing statutes under the Es-
tablishment Clause. 
The Village of Kiryas 
Joel is a village designed specif-
ically to include only the practi-
tioners of a strict form ofJuda-
ism. In 1989, a state statute, 
1989 N. Y.Laws, ch. 748, 
("Chapter 748") removed the 
village from the Monroe-
Woodbury Central School Dis-
trict and established a separate 
school district, drawn accord-
ing to the Kiryas Joel village 
lines. Because almost all chil-
dren in the newly-created dis-
trict attended parochial schools, 
the district's primary purpose 
was to provide a public special-
education program for handi-
capped children. 
Just a few months prior 
to the district's commencement 
of operations, Respondents 
Grumet and Hawk and the New 
York State School Boards As-
sociation challenged Chapter 
748 as violative of the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. Applying the three 
factors established in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, known as the Lemon 
test, the trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for the respon-
dents, finding that the statute 
violated the Establishment 
Clause because it promoted no 
secular purpose, had the effect 
of advancing religion, and fos-
tered excessive governmental 
entanglement with religion. The 
Appellate Division and the Court 
of Appeals of New York both 
affirmed and, after staying the 
mandate of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, the United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. 
In an opinion written by 
Justice Souter, the Supreme 
Court began its analysis by not-
ing that the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses of the 
United States Constitution re-
quire government neutrality to-
ward religion. Grumet, 114 
S.Ct. at 2487. The majority 
maintained that because Chap-
ter 748 delegated civic authori-
ty to a religious group, it violat-
ed the "constitutional com-
mand" of neutrality toward re-
ligion. Id The Court compared 
Chapter 748 to the statute which 
was invalidated in Larkin v. 
Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 
116 (1982). In Larkin, the 
Court found that a statute vio-
lated the Establishment Clause 
by granting a veto power to 
churches, synagogues, and 
schools over liquor license ap-
plications for premises located 
within 500 feet of the church, 
synagogue, or school. The stat-
ute violated the neutrality re-
quirement by conveying gov-
ernmental powers to 
religious bodies, while not in-
suring that such power would 
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be used solely for secular pur-
poses. Grumet, 114 S.Ct. at 
2488 (citing Larkin, 459 U.S. 
116). 
Because an unusual Act 
of the legislature created the 
school district, the majority 
found there was "reason for 
concern . . . that the legislature 
[would] provide equally to oth-
er religious ( and nonreligious) 
groups." Id at 2491. Observ-
ing that the authority bestowed 
upon the Village ofKiryas Joel 
was unique, the Court deter-
mined that future communities 
would have no guarantee ofju-
dicial review of similar state 
actions, providing no way for 
the Court to determine if the 
government was favoring one 
group over another. Id Next, 
the Court carefully emphasized 
that what invalidated the statute 
as an unconstitutional establish-
ment of religion was not "[t]he 
fact that Chapter 748 
facilitate[ d] the practice of reli-
gion." Id at 2492. Thus, the 
Court recognized and rejected 
the argument that Chapter 748 
was merely an accommodation 
of religion. 
Finally, the Court deter-
mined that Chapter 748 dele-
gated civic power to a religious 
group, raising questions as to 
whether religious favoritism had 
been used to establish the school 
district. Id at 2494. Themajor-
ity concluded that the statute 
failed the neutrality test, went 
beyond the permissible 
accomodation of religion, and 
therefore violated the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amend-
ment. Id 
A plurality of the court, 
including Justices Souter, 
Blackmun, Stevens, and 
Ginsburg found the Larkin rea-
soning persuasive, notwith-
standing the factual distinction: 
Chapter 748 specifically dele-
gated power to the voters in the 
school district, whereas in 
Larkin the power was given to 
the religious group leaders. "In 
light ofthe circumstances of this 
case, this distinction turns out 
to lack constitutional signifi-
cance ... [and it] is one ofform, 
not substance." Id. at 2488. 
The plurality explained that be-
cause the State of New York 
drew the lines of the district 
knowing the religious enclave 
would have "exclusive control 
of the political subdivision" it 
was essentially equivalent to the 
Larkin case. Id 
By divesting political 
power to a religious sect, the 
statute resulted in a "forbidden 
'fusion of governmental and 
religious functions. '" Id at 
2490 (quoting Larkin, 459U.S. 
at 126). The plurality enunciat-
ed that Chapter 748 impermissi-
bly delegated civic authority 
based on religious beliefs, 
evinced by three factors. First, 
the legislature was aware of the 
village's exclusive control of the 
school district. Id at 2489. 
Second, the creation ofa small-
er school district ran contrary to 
the customary practices of the 
State of New York. Id at 2490. 
Third, the district was created 
deliberately in a special and un-
usual legislative Act. Id. 
In a separate concur-
rence, JusticeBlackmun empha-
----------~~--
sized that the Court should ad-
here to the principles enunciat-
ed in Lemon. Justice Stevens 
also wrote a separate concur-
rence joined by Justices 
Blackmun and Ginsburg. Jus-
tice Stevens insisted that Chap-
ter 748 established, rather than 
just accommodated, religion be-
cause the school district lines 
were drawn to provide "official 
support" to the faith. Id. at 
2495. Concurring in part and in 
the judgment, Justice 0' Connor 
expressed the difficulty in re-
ducing the Establishment Clause 
to a single test. Justice 
0' Connor stressed that a case 
by case approach is necessary to 
free the Court from the unitary 
approach of Lemon. Id. at 2499-
2500. The final concurrence, 
written by Justice Kennedy, ex-
pressed the view that Chapter 
748 should be invalidated be-
cause the legislature drew polit-
ical boundaries solely on the 
basis of religion. 
In a vigorous dissent, 
Justice Scalia, with whom Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas joined, criticized the 
majority for concluding a facial-
ly neutral statute had been reli-
giously motivated. The dissent 
argued thatthe statute was based 
not on religion, but rather on the 
"cultural distinctiveness" of the 
group. Id at 2510. Further, the 
dissent reasoned that even if 
Chapter 748 was based on reli-
gion, this would merely consti-
tute "permissible accommoda-
tion" of religion, not establish-
ment. Id at 2511. 
In Grumet, the Supreme 
Court stressed the importance 
of neutrality in governmental 
action toward religion by inval-
idating a statute designed to aid 
a religious enclave. The deci-
sion signaled the Court's recog-
Ibanez v. Florida Dept 
of Business and Profes-
sional Regulation, Bd of 
Accountancy: 
STATE BEARS 
BURDEN OF 
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CERTIFIED FINAN-
CIAL PLANNER AND 
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nition of the need to evolve from 
the frequently criticized Lemon 
test. By not developing a work-
able standard, the Court left lit-
tle guidance to legislatures and 
In Ibanez v. Florida 
Dept. of Business and Profes-
sional Regulation, Bd of Ac-
countancy, 114 S. Ct. 2084 
(1994), the United States Su-
preme Court reiterated the 
heavy burden incumbent upon 
state governments attempting 
to censure or limit constitution-
ally protected commercial 
speech when it considered the 
disclosure of validly held desig-
nations of "Certified Public 
Accountant" (CPA) and "Cer-
tified Financial Planner" (CFP), 
by a person holding herself out 
as an attorney, in advertising 
and other communications with 
the public. The Court held that 
the State must demonstrate with 
sufficient specificity, not mere 
speculation or conjecture, that 
the public would actually be 
misled or harmed by the Peti-
tioner's commercial speech, if 
the State desires to restrict truth-
ful commercial speech. The 
State must also show that the 
manner of restriction is no more 
extensive than that which is nec-
essaryto serve the State's inter-
est. In so holding, the Court 
addressed whether the CFP des-
ignation is commonly recog-
nized and, consequently, wheth-
lower courts in determining 
whether a statute passes consti-
tutional muster under the Es-
tablishment Clause. 
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er it would mislead a consumer 
into thinking that a CFP is cer-
tified by the State. 
The Petitioner, Silvia 
Safille Ibanez, is a practicing 
attorney in Winter Haven, Flor-
ida. In addition to being a mem-
ber of the Florida Bar, Ibanez is 
licensed by the Respondent, 
Florida Board of Accountancy 
(Board), as a CP A, and is autho-
rized to use the designation 
"Certified Financial Planner" 
or "CFP" by a private organi-
zation known as the Certified 
Financial Planner Board of Stan-
dards (CFPBS). 
The gravamen of the 
Board's Gomplaint is that Ibanez 
engaged in "false, deceptive, 
and misleading" advertising 
when she included her creden-
tials as a CPA and a CFP in her 
yellow pages listing, under the 
"Attorneys" section, as well as 
in her other communications 
with the public. The Board 
instituted an investigation, and 
eventually a complaint against 
Ibanez, after receiving an anon-
ymous copy of her yellow pages 
listing. Pursuant to various sec-
tions of the Public Accountancy 
Act, Board Rules, and the Flor-
ida Administrative Code, the 
